

Community tools to fight against DDoS

Fakrul Alam
fakrul@apnic.net

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DDoS

- Denial of Service (DoS) / Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is the act of
 - performing an attack which prevents the system from providing services to legitimate users
- Denial of Service attacks take many forms, and utilize many attack vectors
- Used to cover up other attack vectors

Types of Attacks

- Volume Based Attacks
- Application Layer Attacks

Application-layer DDoS attacks are becoming increasingly sophisticated



2016 Dyn cyberattack

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The **2016 Dyn cyberattack** took place on October 21, 2016, and involved multiple [distributed denial-of-service attacks](#) (DDoS attacks) targeting systems operated by [Domain Name System](#) (DNS) provider [Dyn](#), which caused major Internet platforms and services to be unavailable to large swathes of users in Europe and North America.^{[2][3]} The groups [Anonymous](#) and New World Hackers claimed responsibility for the attack, but scant evidence was provided.^{[4][*better source needed*]}

As a DNS provider, Dyn provides to end-users the service of mapping an Internet [domain name](#)—when, for instance, entered into a [web browser](#)—to its corresponding [IP address](#). The [distributed denial-of-service](#) (DDoS) attack was accomplished through a large number of DNS lookup requests from tens of millions of IP addresses.^[5] The activities are believed to have been executed through a [botnet](#) consisting of a large number of [Internet-connected devices](#)—such as [printers](#), [IP cameras](#), [residential gateways](#) and [baby monitors](#)—that had been infected with the [Mirai](#) malware. With an estimated throughput of 1.2 [terabits per second](#), the attack is, according to experts, the largest DDoS attack on record.^[6]

Addressing DDoS attacks

- **Preparation**

- Deploy necessary tools and grab list

- **Detection**

- Detect incoming fake requests

- **Mitigation**

- Diversion : Send traffic to a specialized device that removes the fake packets from the traffic stream while retaining the legitimate packets
- Return : Send back the clean traffic to the server

3 Community tools

- Bogon Filter
 - <https://www.team-cymru.org/bogon-reference.html>
- Flow Sonar
 - <https://www.team-cymru.org/Flow-Sonar.html>
- UTRS (Unwanted Traffic Removal Service)
 - <https://www.team-cymru.org/UTRS/index.html>

1. Bogon Filter

Bogon Filter

- A bogon prefix is a route that should never appear in the Internet routing table
 - Bogons are defined as Martians (private and reserved addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 5735, and RFC 6598) and netblocks that have not been allocated to a RIR by the IANA
- These are commonly found as the source addresses of DDoS attacks
- Study shows 60% of the naughty packets were obvious bogons
- Bogon and fullbogon lists are NOT static lists

Bogon Filter : Configuration IPv4

```
router bgp 17821
 neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx remote-as 65332
 neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx description CYMRUBOGONS
 neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx ebgp-multihop 5
 neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx password 7 070C134D575F0A5116
 neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx update-source Loopback0
 !
 address-family ipv4
  neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx activate
  neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx soft-reconfiguration inbound
  neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx prefix-list CYMRU-OUT-V4 out
  neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx route-map CYMRUBOGONS-V4 in
 !
 !configure community list to accept the bogon prefixes into the route-map
 ip community-list 100 permit 65332:17821
 !
 !configure route-map. Remember to apply it to the proper peering sessions.
 route-map CYMRUBOGONS-V4 permit 10
  description IPv4 Filter bogons learned from cymru.com bogon route-servers
  match community 100
  set ip next-hop 192.0.2.1
 !
 !set a bogon next-hop on all routers that receive the bogons
 ip route 192.0.2.1 255.255.255.255 Null0
 !
 ip prefix-list CYMRU-OUT-V4 seq 5 deny 0.0.0.0/0 le 32
```


Bogon Filter : Configuration IPv6

```
router bgp 17821
 neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx remote-as 65332
 neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx description CYMRUBOGONS
 neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx ebgp-multihop 5
 neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx password 7 0458390716775F1A08
 neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx update-source Loopback0
 !
 address-family ipv6
  neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx activate
  neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx soft-reconfiguration inbound
  neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx prefix-list CYMRU-OUT-V6 out
  neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx route-map CYMRUBOGONS-V6 in
 !
 !configure community list to accept the bogon prefixes into the route-map
 ip community-list 100 permit 65332:17821
 !
 !configure route-map. Remember to apply it to the proper peering sessions.
 route-map CYMRUBOGONS-V6 permit 10
  description IPv6 Filter bogons learned from cymru.com bogon route-servers
  match community 100
  set ipv6 next-hop 2001:DB8:0:DEAD:BEEF::1
 !
 !set a bogon next-hop on all routers that receive the bogons
 ipv6 route 2001:DB8:0:DEAD:BEEF::1/128 Null0
 !
 ipv6 prefix-list CYMRU-OUT-V6 seq 5 deny ::/0 le 128
```

Bogon Filter : Output

```
APNIC-Training-Lab01#show ip bgp 31.22.8.0/21
BGP routing table entry for 31.22.8.0/21, version 175332535
Paths: (1 available, best #1, table default, not advertised to EBGp peer)
  Advertised to update-groups:
    1
  Refresh Epoch 1
  65332, (received & used)
    192.0.2.1 from 38.229.66.20 (38.229.66.20)
      Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external, best
      Community: 65332:17821 no-export
      rx pathid: 0, tx pathid: 0x0
```

Bogon Filter : Status

- The IPv4 fullbogons list is approximately 3,803 prefixes.
 - [date : 10th May 2017]

Neighbor	V	AS	MsgRcvd	MsgSent	TblVer	InQ	OutQ
Up/Down	State/PfxRcd						
38.229.xxx.xxx	4	65332	12017	12017	186072391	0	0
1w0d	3803						

- The IPv6 fullbogons list is approximately 84,908 prefixes.
 - [date : 10th May 2017]

Neighbor	V	AS	MsgRcvd	MsgSent	TblVer	InQ	OutQ
Up/Down	State/PfxRcd						
2404:A800:xxxx:xx::xxxx							
	4	9498	3239994	72131	40075514	0	0
84908							3w1d

Bogon Filter : Peering

- Contact bogonrs@cymru.com
 1. Which bogon types you wish to receive (traditional IPv4 bogons, IPv4 fullbogons, and/or IPv6 fullbogons)
 2. Your AS number
 3. The IP address(es) you want us to peer with
 4. Does your equipment support MD5 passwords for BGP sessions?
 5. Optional: your GPG/PGP public key
- <https://www.team-cymru.org/bogon-reference-bgp.html>

2. Flow Sonar

Flow Sonar


- The Team Cymru Flow Sonar system is a powerful tool for network managers to visually identify and understand what is happening on their network at any given time
- Leveraging the free and open-source framework provided by Peter Haag of SWITCH
- Special plugins "dosrannu" developed by Team Cymru to track malicious activity on your network
- Unique dosrannu feeds alerted to DDoS attacks, compromised machines, and the presence of connections to C&C hosts

Flow Sonar

It's
nfsens/nfdump!!!

Home Graphs Details Alerts Stats Plugins live Bookmark URL Profile: live

Overview Profile: live, Group: (nogroup)



udp trend is 97.85% (down)
tcp flows tcp % diff udp flows udp % diff


timestamp	count	src ip	src port	dst ip	dst port	protocol	alert source	type
2010-10-19 20:54:14	20	51886	8082	6	ip reputation	botnetcc		
2010-10-19 20:52:35	36	25	1521	6	ip reputation	proxy		
2010-10-19 20:52:08	12	1547	80	6	ip reputation	proxy		
2010-10-19 20:51:54	16	80	4849	6	ip reputation	proxy		
2010-10-19 20:51:32	24	1521	25	6	ip reputation	proxy		
2010-10-19 20:50:29	8	8082	51886	6	ip reputation	botnetcc		
2010-10-19 20:50:05	28	3125	25	6	ip reputation	proxy		
2010-10-19 20:49:04	28	25	3125	6	ip reputation	proxy		
2010-10-19 20:48:21	36	4115	25	6	ip reputation	proxy		
2010-10-19 20:48:15	20	41402	25	6	ip reputation	proxy		
2010-10-19 20:48:01	84	34452	80	6	ip reputation	botnetcc		
2010-10-19 20:48:00	4	11259	445	6	ip reputation	botnetcc		
2010-10-19 20:47:44	48	25	4115	6	ip reputation	proxy		
2010-10-19 20:47:22	28	25	41402	6	ip reputation	proxy		
2010-10-19 20:47:03	16	45180	25	6	ip reputation	proxy		
2010-10-19 20:46:58	20	56645	25	6	ip reputation	proxy		
2010-10-19 20:46:07	12	25	45180	6	ip reputation	proxy		
2010-10-19 20:45:56	20	25	56645	6	ip reputation	proxy		
2010-10-19 20:42:12	4	80	34299	6	ip reputation	botnetcc		
2010-10-19 20:39:06	4	80	4732	6	ip reputation	proxy		
2010-10-19 20:37:33	36	30082	52311	6	ip reputation	botnetcc		
2010-10-19 20:34:28	4	33333	445	6	ip reputation	botnetcc		
2010-10-19 20:34:28	4	0	2816	1	ip reputation	botnetcc		
2010-10-19 20:34:00	12	52311	30082	6	ip reputation	botnetcc		
2010-10-19 20:30:18	12	1621	80	6	ip reputation	proxy		
2010-10-19 20:29:54	4	65346	53	17	ip reputation	botnetcc		
2010-10-19 20:29:48	12	80	1621	6	ip reputation	proxy		
2010-10-19 20:29:08	4	61457	445	6	ip reputation	botnetcc		
2010-10-19 20:28:38	4	0	781	1	ip reputation	botnetcc		
2010-10-19 20:25:10	32	3284	80	6	ip reputation	botnetcc		
2010-10-19 20:24:44	8	80	3250	6	ip reputation	botnetcc		
2010-10-19 20:19:12	256	41162	80	6	ip reputation	botnetcc		
2010-10-19 20:16:27	8	37247	53	17	ip reputation	botnetcc		
2010-10-19 20:16:18	4	1232	25	6	ip reputation	proxy		

Flow Sonar : Get It


- Contact outreach@cymru.com
 1. Team Cymru will send hardware
 - 1 Server
 - 1 Router
- <https://www.team-cymru.org/Flow-Sonar.html>

3. UTRS (Unwanted Traffic Removal Service)


RTBH 101




RTBH 101



RTBH 101



RTBH 101



RTBH Upstream

- Check whether your upstream provider support RTBH
- Configure & Test RTBH before incident
- Only announce IPv4 /32's from address space you originate or your customer

UTRS

- It's based on the basic principle of DDoS filtering; Remotely Triggered Black Hole Filtering
- UTRS is a system that helps mitigate large infrastructure attacks by leveraging:
 - an existing network of cooperating BGP speakers such as ISPs, hosting providers and educational institutions
 - that automatically distributes verified BGP-based filter rules from victim to cooperating networks

UTRS : Configuration

```
router bgp 17821
 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx remote-as 64496
 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx description CYMRUBOGONS-UTRS
 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx ebgp-multihop 5
 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx transport connection-mode passive
 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx password 7 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx update-source Loopback0
!
address-family ipv4
 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx activate
 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx send-community
 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx soft-reconfiguration inbound
 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx route-map UTRS-OUT out
 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx route-map UTRS-IN in
!
access-list 1 remark utility ACL to deny everything
access-list 1 deny any
!
ip prefix-list 32-only permit 0.0.0.0/0 ge 32
ip community-list standard RTBH permit 17821:0
!
route-map UTRS-IN permit 10
 match ip address prefix-list 32-only
route-map UTRS-IN deny 100
 match ip address 1
!
route-map UTRS-OUT permit 10
 match ip address prefix-list 32-only
 match community RTBH
route-map UTRS-OUT deny 100
 match ip address 1
```

ip route 203.176.189.10 255.255.255.255 null0

APNIC

123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100

UTRS : Apply

- Newly launched service
 - Quite picky to choose whom to peer
 - Do organization verification
- <https://www.team-cymru.org/UTRS/index.html>
- FAQ:
 - <https://www.cymru.com/jtk/misc/utrs.html>

How UTRS varies from RTBH with upstream!

Other Efforts

- NANOG BCOP : DDoS-DoS-attack-BCOP
 - <http://bcop.nanog.org/index.php/DDoS-DoS-attack-BCOP>
- Routing Resilience Manifesto
 - Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS)
 - <https://www.routingmanifesto.org/manrs/>



**KEEP
CALM
IT'S
JUST A
DDOS**

Questions!

Fakrul Alam
fakrul@apnic.net