# **Internet Number Registry Services the Next Generation**

RDAP and RPKI

#### **Overview**

- What are registry services
- Today's registry services
  - whois
- The next generation...
  - Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)
  - Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)

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# Registries?

- Organisations running registry services
  - With authority for registration of some "Public Resource"
- Public databases describing status of resources
  - Land titles, vehicle registrations, phone numbers
  - Internet registries Domain Names, protocols, INRs
  - e.g. .com, .th, IPv4, IPv4, ASNs
- Internet Registries
  - Authoritative registry/database function
  - Public registry service function
  - gTLDs, ccTLDs
  - RIRs, NIRs, LIRs, ISPs...

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# Registry services (INRs)

- whois
  - Query service on TCP port 43 (RFC 812, 1982)
  - Very simple service
  - Query and response are not standardised
- Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) (NEW since 2015)
  - API for access to "whois" registry data
  - Automation, AAA, i18N, redirection, extensibility
- Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) (since 2010)
  - PKI for INRs
  - Cryptographically verifiable "ownership" of INRs

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# whois

#### whois command line

```
$ whois -h whois.apnic.net 210.17.9.242
                                                                             Query to port 43
% [whois.apnic.net]
% Whois data copyright terms
                             http://www.apnic.net/db/dbcopyright.html
% Information related to '210.17.0.0 - 210.17.127.255'
% Abuse contact for '210.17.0.0 - 210.17.127.255' is 'ethanchen@taiwanmobile.com'
              210.17.0.0 - 210.17.127.255
inetnum:
              TTN-TW
netname:
descr:
              Taiwan Telecommunication Network Services Co., LTD.
                                                                               "Blob" reply
descr:
              110 , 8F , No 89 , Sung Jen RD , Taipei
country:
admin-c:
              IP11-AP
                                                                                - undefined
tech-c:
              TP11-AP
remarks:
              service provider
mnt-bv:
              MAINT-TW-TWNIC
mnt-irt:
              IRT-TFN-TW
mnt-lower:
              MAINT-TTN-AP
status:
              ALLOCATED PORTABLE
last-modified: 2011-06-01T04:13:58Z
              APNTC
source:
```


#### whois www interface



HTML wrapper

Same blob

#### whois at APNIC



#### Whois – limitations

- "blob" query and result formats
  - Registry-specific questions and answers (eg RPSL)
  - Automation is difficult
- No AAA model
  - Built for public service only
- Most servers serve US-ASCII only
  - i18n is undefined
- No redirection
  - User/client must find the right server

#### **RDAP**

Registration Data Access Protocol

#### **RDAP**

- RDAP is the successor to the ageing WHOIS protocol.
  - Stardardised by IETF
- Query: REST
  - REpresentational State Transfer via HTTP
  - Query defined within URL issued to RESTful server
  - Inherits useful features from HTTP/HTTPS (AAA, redirection...)
- Response: JSON
  - JavaScript Object Notation
  - Standardised text representation of structured data
  - Easily used by JavaScript/HTML5, Java, Perl, Python...

\* Source: RDAP.org

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#### **RDAP JSON raw**

#### \$ curl http://rdap.apnic.net/ip/210.17.9.242


{"rdapConformance":["history version 0","rdap level 0"],"notices":[{"title":"Source","description":["Objects returned came from source", "APNIC"]}, {"title": "Terms and Conditions", "description":["This is the APNIC WHOIS Database query service. The objects are in RDAP format."], "links":[{"value":"http://rdap.apnic.net/ip/210.17.9.242", "rel":"terms-ofservice", "href": "http://www.apnic.net/db/dbcopyright.html", "type": "text/html" } ] } ], "country": "TW", "eventS": [{"eventAction": "last changed", "eventDate": "2011-06-01T04:13:58Z"}], "name": "TTN-TW", "remarks": [{ "description": ["Taiwan Telecommunication Network Services Co.,LTD.","110 , 8F , No 89 , Sung Jen RD , Taipei"],"title":"description"},{"description";["service provider"],"title":"remarks"}],"type":"ALLOCATED PORTABLE", "endAddress": "210.17.127.255", "ipVersion": "v4", "startAddress": "210.17.0.0", "handle": "210.17.0.0 -210.17.127.255", "objectClassName": "ip network", "links":[{"value":"http://rdap.apnic.net/ip/210.17.9.242", "rel":"self", "href": "http://rdap.apnic.net/ip/210.17.0.0/17", "type ":"application/rdap+json"}], "entities":[{"roles":["abuse"], "events":[{"eventAction":"last changed", "eventDate":"2017-01-22T22:54:59Z"}], "vcardArray":["vcard",[["version",{},"text","4.0"],["fn",{},"text","IRT-TFN-TW"],["kind",{},"text","group"],["adr",{"label":"7F., No. 172-1, Sec. 2, Ji-Lung Rd.\nTaipei City 106, Taiwan R.O.C."},"text",["","","","","","",""]],["email",{},"text","ethanchen@taiwanmobile.com"],["email",{"pref":"1"},"text","ethanchen@taiwanmobile.com"] anmobile.com"]]], "handle": "IRT-TFN-TW", "objectClassName": "entity", "links": [{"value": "http://rdap.apnic.net/ip/210.17.9.242", "rel": "self", "href": "http://rdap.apnic.net/e ntity/IRT-TFN-TW", "type": "application/rdap+json" } ] } , { "roles": ["administrative", "technical"], "events": [{ "eventAction": "last changed", "eventDate": "2011-12-06T00:10:19z" }], "remarks": [{"description": ["### Crime, Abuse, Spam, Security ###", "CSC TEL: 0809-000-188", "CSC TEL: +886-2-4066-0357", "abuse@tfn.com.tw", "abuse@tfn.com.tw", "### Crime, Abuse, Spam, Security ###"],"title":"remarks"}],"vcardArray":["vcard",[["version",{},"text","4.0"],["fn",{},"text","TTN IP-Team"],["kind",{},"text","group"],["adr",{"label":"Taiwan Mobile Co., Ltd.\nNetwork Assurance & Technical Support Div.\n# Ex TTN merged\n8F.,No 172-1, Sec 2, Ji-Lung RD\nTaipei 106 Taiwan"},"text",["","","","","","","",""]],["tel",{"type":"voice"},"text","+886-2-6638-6888"],["tel",{"type":"fax"},"text","+886-2-6639-0607"],["email",{},"text","whois@ttn.com.tw"]]],"handle":"IP11-AP", "objectClassName": "entity", "links": [{"value": "http://rdap.apnic.net/ip/210.17.9.242", "rel": "self", "href": "http://rdap.apnic.net/e ntity/IP11-AP", "type": "application/rdap+json" } ] } ], "port43": "whois.apnic.net" }

HTTP "get"

JSON reply

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#### **RDAP JSON raw**




Web client

JSON reply

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
#### **RDAP JSON formatted**



Browser plugin

Structured JSON


#### **RDAP** client




Web-based client

Processed result

#### **RDAP** client




# RDAP application (whowas)




https://www.apnic.net/whowas


# RDAP application (vizAS)



# RDAP application (vizAS)



#### **RDAP**



#### **RDAP** benefits

- Automation JSON input to common programming languages
  - Integration with firewall, NMS, IPAM...
- "Differentiated Access"
  - If needed
- Speaks your language (and character set)
  - Can implement server-side or in-client language preference
- One stop query
  - Will auto-redirect to the right authoritative server
- Web protocol is CDN friendly
  - Serve local, via anycast or DNS redirection methods
  - Cacheable, survives DDoS longer since distributed

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#### **APNIC RDAP Status**

- First implemented May 2015
  - Adjunct service query to WHOIS radix tree (in memory)
  - Rewrote RPSL on-the-fly
- Re-implemented into WHOWAS Late 2016
  - Static in-memory data model. Fast response
- Working with NIRs
  - Hope to serve <nir>.rdap.apnic.net more-specific service
- APNIC region-wide consistent service model goal for 2019
  - Working with NIRs and other RIRs

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#### **RPKI**

Resource Public Key Infrastructure


#### **RPKI**

- RPKI is a public key infrastructure (PKI) framework, designed to secure BGP routing
  - Based on X.509 PKI standards
- RPKI adds INR information to X.509 certificates issued to resource holders
  - Representing "ownership" and other status
  - Certification hierarchy follows INR delegation hierarchy

 $IANA \rightarrow RIR \rightarrow NIR \rightarrow ISP \rightarrow ...$ 

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# **RPKI** hierarchy



## **RPKI** application: ROA


- Route Origin Authorization
  - List of prefixes with ASN authorized to announce
  - Signed by the prefix holder with RPKI certificate

Prefix	203.176.32.0/19	
Max-length	/24	
Origin ASN	AS17821	

- ROV relies on the integrity of the ROA
  - If valid, can now be used to construct route filters


# **Route Origin Validation (ROV)**

Using RPKI Route Origin Authorisation (ROA)



# **Route Origin Validation (ROV)**


Using RPKI Route Origin Authorisation (ROA)



# **RPKI** application: RTA

- Resource Tagged Attestation
  - Use of RPKI cert to sign an arbitrary object
- RTA application: LOA
  - Replace existing informal "letter of authority" practice
  - Now digitally secured and can be automated
- Pilot implementation
  - In development at APNIC (via MyAPNIC)
  - IETF draft in progress

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
### **RPKI at APNIC**


#### **RPKI Service Models**

- Hosted service
  - APNIC performs CA functions on behalf of members
  - Manage keys, repository etc
  - Generate certificates for resource delegations
  - This "Member CA" is separate from the "APNIC CA"
- Provisioning model
  - Member operates full RPKI system including CA
  - Communication with APNIC via provisioning protocol
  - This is live at JPNIC, CNNIC and TWNIC (IDNIC in progress)

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# **ROA** deployment – Global






NIST RPKI Monitor 2019-04-07

https://rpki-monitor.antd.nist.gov

12.85%

0.75%

# **ROA** deployment – Regional



#### **RPKI** benefits

- Improved in-band verification of resource custodianship
  - Much safer than manually checking whois or IRR database
  - Ease of automation
- Primary application: Secure Origin (ROA)
  - A first step to preventing many attacks on BGP integrity
  - BGP Path remains a problem which is under development
  - Related information such as IRR Policy can now leverage strong proofs of validity (end the maintainer-authority problem in RADB/IRR)
- Also: secure attestation (RTA)
  - And more in future?

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#### How do I start?

- Create ROAs to better protect your own routes
  - Encourage your peers/customers to do the same
  - Encourage your IXP to implement ROV in the RS
- Then
  - Set up route validation at your own border routers
  - Using public or IXP validator, or your own
- APNIC members, use MyAPNIC
  - We can help!
  - Please contact APNIC Helpdesk
  - And...

#### Over to Tashi...

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