BKNIX Peering Forum, 22 May 2025

Shaken and (dis)connected? Lessons on Internet Resilience from the Myanmar-Thailand Earthquake

Internet Society

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Myanmar-Thailand Earthquake

March 28th 2025





https://restofworld.org/2025/myanmar-earthquake-internet-shutdown/



Communication Network Collapse: A Crisis Multiplier

- Critical Infrastructure Destroyed (Myanmar power grid collapse)
- Telecom Towers: 60% of towers in Sagaing and 45% in Mandalay were toppled, severing mobile connectivity for 2.3 million people.
- Fiber Optic Cables: Key routes along the Yangon-Mandalay highway—a lifeline for 70% of Myanmar's Internet traffic—were buried under landslides.

Source: Baudcom





https://bbmaps.itu.int/bbmaps/

Did you know?

The Myanmar earthquake also marks the first time a large magnitude earthquake was detected using an array of telecommunication submarine cable networks turned into more than 100 seismic sensors, Mikael Mazur of Nokia Bell Labs.

Seismological Society of America 2025









Regional outages in Myanmar (IODA)









https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/country/MM?from=1742689308&until=1743812508

IODA: Internet Connectivity







Cloudflare: Announce IP space

Announced IP Address Space



https://radar.cloudflare.co

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https://radar.cloudflare.com/routing/mm?dateStart=2025-03-23&dateEnd=2025-04-22



Cloudflare: Traffic trends in Myanmar

Sat, March 29 60% drop of traffic

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Cloudflare: Traffic at network level (Myanmar)



MPT-AP - Myanma Posts and Telecommunications (MPT)

Tax. Pre 21

Bytes transferred over the selected time period (2) 42 G, 4

Thui, Mar 27

HTTP bytes

Traffic trends -

1000

5im, Har 21

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Betal triving

AS136255 (10% market share)

30% drop

Set. Mur 20

MCCL-AS-AP - Myanmar Country Co. Bytes transferred over the selected time period (1) 42 (2, n) - Total bytes - HTTP bytes Annotations C Disk. 60% drop they Mar 21 fint. Har 28 blue, Sher 21 Stan, Mar 31 Tup, Mar 28 Stand Link

AS134840 (9% market share)



AS9988 (6.8% market share)

See, Mar 21

1114 10-2

AS136442 (6.3% market share)

Google Transparency Report: YouTube Traffic



https://transparencyreport.google.com/traffic/overview?fraction_traffic=start:1735603200000;end:1747353599999;product:21;region:MM&lu=fraction_traffic&hl=en



Myanmar IXP – MMIX (~40 members)

M-Lab Mean Throughput (Mbps)

Cloudflare: Traffic at network level (Thailand)

TRUEONLINE-AS-AP - True Internet Co.

AS17552 (16% market share)

AS24378 (9% market share)

AIS3G-2100-AS-AP - Advance Wireless Network

AS131445 (21% market share)

AS45758 (% market share)

ENGTAC-AS-TH-AP - Total Access Communication PLC.

Google Transparency Report: YouTube Traffic

https://transparencyreport.google.com/traffic/overview?fraction_traffic=start:1735603200000;end:1747353599999;product:21;region:MM&lu=fraction_traffic&hl=en

Routing (RIPE RIS)

Myanmar

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Thailand

Traceroute from India to Myanmar

28, 2025

Traceroute from India to Myanmar

After March 28, 2025

Content locality - Myanmar

Content Locality - Thailand

How resilient countries are against outages?

Internet Resilience Index architecture

Internet Resilience Globally

Pulse Internet Resilience Index

Internet outages vs Index (2023)

Internet outages vs Index

Internet outages vs Index

Recommendations

Build Earthquake-Resilient Infrastructure

- Enforce seismic-resistant design standards for all telecom infrastructure (e.g., towers, data centers, central offices).
- Elevated and shock-absorbing mounts for critical equipment in flood- or quake-prone areas.
- Seismic risk assessments of all existing telecom infrastructure.
- Mandate periodic resilience audits and public disclosure of telecom companies' disaster recovery plans.

Diversify Network Routes

- Create redundant fiber paths through multiple geographic routes (terrestrial and submarine) to avoid single points of failure.
- Cross-border peering and transit agreements with neighboring countries (e.g., Thailand, India, China, Bangladesh) to ensure failover capacity.

Redundancy of key infrastructure

- Distribute IXPs and critical DNS infrastructure to multiple regions so that damage in one region doesn't isolate the entire country.
- Ensure data centers and IXPs are built in geologically safer zones with backup power, cooling, and connectivity.

Establish Emergency Communication Systems

- Deploy satellite-based communication systems (e.g., VSAT, Starlink, OneWeb) as a backup when terrestrial infrastructure fails.
- Equip emergency responders and government offices with portable mesh networks and satellite phones.
- Implement a national emergency alert system over multiple channels: SMS, radio, social media, and public sirens.

Redundancy is important

- Countries that were significantly impacted by the outages had lower Internet Resilience scores than those that were able to remain operational
- IXPs played a critical role in keeping local traffic flowing when submarine cables were offline.
- Having local content and services like DNS, Email and E-Government services would improve availability of services in the event of outages
- Low Earth Orbit Satellites (LEOs) also help however their coverage is currently low

Human network is very important

- Knowing the right people to call when there are problems is important
- This facilitates faster resolution of issues and therefore return to operation of services
- Building the human network is just as important as building infrastructure. Events like AIS, Peering Forums, NOG meetings and other technical community gatherings are essential to building the human network
- Building the right skills will also ensure that the next generation of engineers will be able to design and maintain the networks

Take aways

- Natural disasters do not just break buildings—they also fracture connectivity.
- They expose the fragility—and resilience—of our digital infrastructure.
- This is a call to rethink physical route diversity, regional redundancy, and realtime monitoring in vulnerable geographies.

Myanmar Internet Project (MIP)

"The military's ongoing internet shutdowns have exacerbated the crisis. For years, the junta has cut off internet access and refuses to restore connectivity even during life-threatening emergencies.

The lack of internet access has severe implications for emergency services, hindering disaster response efforts, obstructing aid coordination, and leaving affected populations unable to reach out for help. "

Source: https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/

Myanmar Internet Project (MUD)

"The military's ongoing the junta has cut off in during life-threatening

The lack of internet ac hindering disaster resp affected populations ι

Source: https://progre

1 April 2025

Myanmar Earthquake: A Crisis Within a Crisis

Amreesh Phokeer Categories: Internet Resilience Resilience, Insights, Internet Society Shutdown

Internet access should not be weaponized or restricted during emergencies—it should be a relief, coordination, and rebuilding tool. ' the crisis. For years, onnectivity even

ency services, ion, and leaving

pulse.internetsociety.org

Your Data Dashboard

- Launched December 2020.
- We curate Internet measurement data from trusted sources to help everyone gain deeper, data-driven insight into the Internet.

Trusted data from multiple sources:

- Benefit: Helps to assess whether efforts to ensure that the Internet remains open, globally connected, secure, and trustworthy are working.
- Benefit: Allows policymakers, researchers, journalists, network operators, civil society groups, and others to better understand the health, availability, and evolution of the Internet.

https://internetsociety.org

Thank You phokeer@isoc.org

